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II 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
TO THE PEAYS. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT THE PEAYS* 
INVOCATION OF "CHROMOSOME AGENCY" 
A. Permission Was Never Granted to the Halls And, Therefore, the Halls Are 
Not Subject to the Permission Given to Smith. 
The Peays assert that permission to use a road need not be given formally or by 
agreement in order to prevent a prescriptive easement from arising. (Appellees' Brief 
at p. 12). This assertion is incorrect. The Halls never received any form of 
permission, be it verbal or nonverbal, that they were using the road with the 
permission of the Peays. Norman Smith, the father Mrs. Hall, was originally given 
permission to cross a portion of Peays' land as well as to park his school bus on a 
portion of Peays5 land. (R. at 200, 1 3; 230, 1 4; and 288, 14.) In 1973, the Halls 
purchased the property from Smith and have continually resided at said location. (R. 
at 404.) Since moving to the property in 1973, the Halls have used the access roadway 
continually until August, 2002, when a gate was installed by Peays. (R. at 358, f 8.) 
During the 29-year period from 1973 through 2003, the Halls were never approached 
by the Peays about the access roadway across a portion of Peays' property, nor were 
they ever given permission by Peays to use such property. (R. at 281.) 
Permission given to Smith by Peays cannot be imputed to the Halls merely 
because Mrs. Hall is related to Smith. The appellees, in their brief, state that the 
"plaintiffs also ignore the fact that at the time permissive use was given, Mrs. Hall was 
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a part of the Norman and Myrle Smith family and, therefore, the permissive use was 
not passed by reason of passage of title but by reason of the permission given to the 
Smith family." (Appellees' brief, p. 15.) The Peays thus assert agency by 
chromosome. There is no such thing. In Homer, et aL v. Smith, et aL 866 P.2d 622 
(Utah 1993), the Court specifically rejected the argument that the presumption of 
permission arises because two parties enjoyed a "close family relationship." Homer 
cited the case of Richins v. Struhs, 412 P.2d 314 (Utah 1966) in rejecting the notion 
that a family or relative relationship could create a permissive use. The court, in 
rejecting the trial court's analysis that the parties were relatives and that a driveway 
was used harmoniously without conflict and was permissive (and therefore did not 
give rise to a prescriptive right-of-way), stated that "the difficulty with this view is that 
it does not give effect to fundamental principles applicable to prescriptive rights." Id. 
at 315. In concluding its analysis, the court held that "in order for the use to have been 
permissive, it would have to appear that the parties understood that the driveway was 
upon the Whipple's (defendant's predecessors) property; that it was with this 
understanding that they gave their consent to its use; and similarly, that the Joneses 
(plaintiffs' predecessors) so understood and accepted and used it." Id. at 316. 
A same or similar analysis applies here. In order for the use to be permissive, 
the Halls and the Peays would need to understood that the accessway was on the 
Peays' property, that it was with this understanding that the Peays gave their consent 
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to its use, and that the Halls understood and accepted and used it in such a manner. 
But the facts do not indicate that any permission was given. The facts do not indicate 
that the Halls were using the accessway by way of permission. The facts do not 
indicate that the Peays consented to the Halls' use of the access road. Rather, what the 
facts do indicate is that the access road was used by the Halls in an adverse fashion 
since the Halls moved to the location in 1973. Therefore, permission was never 
granted to the Halls by the Peays, and any inference that permission flowed through 
Smith to the Halls because of the familial relationship should be rejected. 
B. Permission Was Never Granted to the Halls and Therefore the Use Became 
Adverse Once the Halls Moved to the Location in 1973. 
The Peays assert that the Halls have failed to establish a point at which the 
licensees' use became adverse. (Appellee's Brief at p. 14). It is the Halls2' contention 
that they were never given permission to use the property, thus never to be considered 
as licensees. Rather, the record clearly reflects that permission was given to Smith, the 
father of Mrs. Hall, and never to the Halls. 
Although the initial use by the Smiths may have been permissive, that 
permission ceased when the property was transferred. 
A permissive use necessarily terminates when the 
licensor dies or alienates the servient estate. The grant of 
permission being personal to him, it cannot continue 
beyond his termination of ownership. 
[A] change in the title and ownership of the 
alleged servient estate operates as a revocation 
of a permissive use previously granted and 
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such use may then become adverse and ripen 
into an easement. 
(Footnote omitted.) 2 Thompson on Real Property § 345, at 
241-42 (1980). 
Granston v. Callahan. 52 Wash. App. 288, 295-296, 759 P.2d 462, 466 (1988). In that 
case, two brothers purchased adjoining lots and each treated the other's property as his 
own. One brother built buildings that encroached on the other brother's property. 
The buildings and property were transferred to the daughter of the one brother, and 
the son of the other brother sued to quiet title. The court held the use was permissive 
during the lives of the brothers, but that the use after title was transferred was adversef 
Similarly, in this case any permission given to the Smiths terminated when the 
property was convey to the Halls. Because the Halls never received permission, it 
follows that the use of the roadway by Halls was adverse. This adverse use began at 
the time of the purchase of the property in 1973. The Halls did not know the original 
use was permissive. Therefore, the burden is not on the Halls, as they are not 
licensees, rather, the law provides that "when a claimant has shown that such a use has 
existed peaceably and without interference for the prescriptive period of 20 years, the 
law presumes that the use is adverse to the owner." Richins, 412 P.2d at 315. The 
adverse use began when the Halls purchased and began using the property. 
C. Use of the Access Roadway by the Halls Did Not Constitute a Neighborly 
Accomodation. 
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Just as the Halls never received permission nor was permission given to them by 
the Peays, the Peays never exercised any neighborly accommodation to thereby thwart 
any efforts by the Halls to obtain a prescriptive easement. The appellees, in their 
brief, rely on the unfounded presumption that regardless of the relationship of the 
Halls to Smith, any permission or neighborly accommodation precludes the rising of a 
prescriptive easement. This point has no legal basis or validity. It has been pointed 
out by several courts that "the fact that the parties (predecessors) were friendly or even 
cordial with each other as they appear to have been, it does not prevent a prescriptive 
right from coming into being." Richins, 412 P.2d at 316; see also Valcarce v. 
Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998); Green v. Stansfield. 885 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). The Halls' use of the zccess roadway never arose from permission 
given to Smith, nor was it ever based on any neighborly accommodation between 
themselves and the Peays. Thus, the simple fact that Smith and Peays were friendly 
and cordial should not prevent a prescriptive right from arising on behalf of the Halls. 
All that is required is to show that the use was in fact adverse and appeared to be so. 
Richms, 412 P.2d at 316. 
Further, if such agreement or neighborly accommodation or permission was 
ever granted, it was granted to Smith not the Halls. Halls' use of the road began in 
1973 and continued with the knowledge of the Peays until 2002. The Peays knew that 
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a portion of their property was being used by the Halls, and such use was plainly 
apparent. (R. at 270). 
Even if the Court finds that permission was granted to the Halls, or that a 
neighborly accommodation did occur so as to allow access of a roadway by the Halls, 
such permission or neighborly accommodation is invalid because the Peays never had 
title to the property by which they were giving permission or granting a neighborly 
accommodation. Title to the roadway was not gained by the Peays until 1992. 
II. ACCESS TO THE ROADWAY WAS NOT INTERRUPTED 
REGULARLY THEREBY PRECLUDING ANY CLAIM TO THE 20-
YEAR PERIOD OF UNINTERRUPTED USE. 
It is the Peays' contention that regular routine maintenance on the road which 
was done every three to four years constituted an interruption significant enough to 
thwart the 20-year prescriptive period of the Halls. The deposition testimony of 
Robert Peay indicates that the only road closure mentioned in 1987 was for the 
purpose of asphalting, slurring, and resurfacing his own personal driveway and the 
access road. This deposition was taken on October 21, 2003. On December 12, 2003, 
Robert Peay submitted an affidavit apparently to clarify his deposition testimony by 
stating that the purpose of the periodic closures of the access over his property was so 
that the general public could not establish any rights to cross his property, thereby 
thwarting any right to a prescriptive easement. (R. at 203, f1f 2 and 3.) Nowhere else 
in the record is there any indication that the Peays closed off the access road with the 
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intent of stopping any potential prescriptive easement. There is also no other 
indication in the record, other than the 1987 closure, that the road was closed to stop 
any potential prescriptive easement. 
The deposition testimony of Robert Peay was never amended to indicate his 
true and apparent purpose of closing the road. Rather, a subsequent affidavit was 
submitted apparently attempting to expound on the deposition testimony. Rather 
than expound the deposition testimony, the affidavit contradicts the original 
deposition testimony. He told the truth in his deposition, and backtracked in the 
affidavit. The Court may consider the credibility of testimony offered in support of 
summary judgment, and, indeed, this may in itself pose a factual issue sufficient to 
defeat summary judgment. Webster v. Sill 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983). 
The appellees further go on to cite in their brief how Brigham Young 
University1 effectively blocks its roads for one day a year so as to potentially prevent a 
prescriptive easement from arising. The clear difference between Brigham Young 
University and the Peays is that it is the intent of Brigham Young University to close 
the roads and thereby prevent any prescriptive easement from arising. The intent of 
the Peays in 1987 in blocking the road for maintenance purposes appears to be 
*No where in the record is there any indication as to the validity the appellee's 
statements about Brigham Young University and there need to shut off their roads to 
prevent a prescriptive easement from arising. There is no indication in the record from 
any Brigham Young University representative that purpose of blocking off its roadways 
is to stop a prescriptive easement from arising. 
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specifically for maintenance purposes. It was not until 2003, following deposition 
testimony, that any "clarification" was given as to why the roadway was blocked. 
Intent of the owner is a necessary requirement in determining whether use is to 
be considered interrupted or uninterrupted. Courts have recognized that *[t]o be 
interrupted an obstruction must interrupt the actual use and the obstruction must be 
accompanied by an intent to cause an interruption in use." Keefer v. Jones, 359 A.2d 
735, 738 (Penn. 1976), citing Margoline v. Holefelden 217 A.2d 227 (1966). In 
discussing the defendant's conduct in the blockage of a roadway the Court held that 
"the inference to be drawn from defendant's own testimony is that whatever 
interference to the plaintiffs' use of the area may have resulted from defendant's 
operations was temporary and was not an unambiguous act evincing an intention to 
exclude the plaintiffs from their uninterrupted use of the area." Red Star Yeast and 
Products Co. v. Merchandising Corp., 4 Wis.2d 327, 335, 90 N.W.2d 777 (1958), italics 
added. Also "[m]ere intermission is not interruption." Verh v. Morris, 410 111. 206, 
212, 101 N.E.2d 566 (1951). 
In Wvpchoski v. Berg. 1998 WL 88313 (Conn.Sup.Ct.1998), the court held that 
closing of easement once a year for 24-hours for application of blacktop followed by 
immediate resumption of use by claimant did not interrupt adverse use. 
If it was the intent of the Peays to block the roadway specifically for 
maintenance purposes, such maintenance purposes did not rise to the level of 
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interrupting the use of the Halls and the public. The Halls continued to use the 
roadway after the maintenance was completed. The record does not indicate that the 
Peays had the requisite intent. The Halls have never had to fight, scramble or dispute 
their access of the roadway. The Peays did not have the original intent to interrupt 
the use of the Halls, and such intent cannot arise after the fact. Also, the Peays did not 
own the road which they were closing off. The facts demonstrate that the Peays likely 
owned only a portion of the road when they were closing it. 
III. THE HALLS HAVE MET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A NEW TRIAL 
UNDER THE BASIS OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE 
PURSUANT TO RULE 59. 
The Peays assert that the Halls were in possession of the purported "new" 
evidence from the commencement of the litigation. (Appellee's Brief p. 24). On May 
18, 2004, oral arguments were heard by the court on the cross-motions for summary 
judgment. The court entered a Memorandum Decision dated May 24, 2004. On June 
17, 2004, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment were filed and 
signed by the Honorable Gary D. Stott. Pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the Halls moved the court for a new trial based on newly discovered 
evidence obtained by them following the hearing on the cross-motions for summary 
judgment. 
At the time of the hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment, the 
Halls had no survey or title information which would have confirmed the fact that the 
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Peays did not own the property over which they claimed to give permission. If the 
Peays do not own the subject property, or only own a portion of the subject property, 
no permission can be granted, nor can a prescriptive right be stopped by the Peays. 
Throughout the course of the litigation, the access roadway has been commonly 
referred to as the Peays' property. In the Peays' Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment, they state that they purchased the property on which their 
home and the area of permissive use lie in 1969. (R. at 230, f 1.) Peays state that in 
1969 they gave Norman Smith and his family permission to cross the front part of his 
property so that Norman Smith and his family could have more convenient access to 
their property than their legal access. (R. at 230, t 4.) Peays further state that since 
purchasing the property in 1969, they have closed off access to the Halls' property 
from Peays' property on the south so that no prescriptive easement could arise. (R. at 
229, t 8.) Further in their memorandum the Peays argue that in 1987 Craig Bybee of 
Bybee Excavation and Asphalt completely resurfaced and asphalted the "defendants' 
road." (R. at 229, t10.) The property Is commonly referred to as "his [Peay] 
property" and "defendant's property." Throughout the course of the litigation, all 
references made to the access road by the Peays and the Halls were made presuming 
the access road belonged completely to the Peays. All references made in the record 
clearly indicate that Peay was the owner of the property from the original purchase of 
his property in 1969. The question is whether the Halls, as ordinary people, have an 
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obligation to expend a considerable sum of money on a survey report which, by all 
indications, would be meaningless absent the knowledge that the property was not 
owned by the Peays until 1992. It is clear from the record that the Halls relied on the 
Peays' representations to their detriment, and that granting of a new trial is 
appropriate under the circumstances. Furthermore, the facts of this case are not that 
of a normal easement dispute where a boundary line is in question. Rather, the facts 
demonstrate that the key question appears to be one of permission. Nothing in the 
facts of the case pointed to the need to conduct a boundary line survey. This is not a 
standard boundary line disagreement where a survey is vital to the dispute. It was not 
until after the hearing on the Motions for Summary Judgment that a boundary issue 
was ever presented. Given the facts known to the Halls prior to the hearing, a 
property survey in this prescriptive easement case would have useless. 
It is the Peays' contention that the plaintiffs were in possession of the newly 
discovered evidence or deed from the commencement of the limitation and, therefore, 
said deed cannot be considered newly discovered evidence. The test, however, is (1) 
whether the existence of newly discovered evidence is material and competent, (2) that 
by due diligence the evidence could not have been discovered or produced before trial, 
and (3) that the evidence is not merely cumulative or incidental but is substantial 
enough that with the evidence there is a reasonably likelihood of a different result. 
Promax Development Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Points 1 
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and 3 of the three-prong test are met in that the newly discovered evidence is clearly 
material and competent, and that it is not cumulative or incidental and also could have 
a substantial impact producing a completely different result. If the newly discovered 
evidence is admitted and a new trial is granted, there is a substantial likelihood, based 
on the survey reports, that a fact finder would find that the Peays did not own the 
property over which they gave Smith permission to use, or in their attempt to close 
the road for maintenance purposes. Without ownership of the road, the prescriptive 
period would continue to run, thereby allowing the Halls a prescriptive easement on 
the access roadway. 
The question that remains is whether the Halls used due diligence in discovering 
the evidence prior to trial. The record specifically demonstrates that the Halls had no 
idea as to the legal significance of the deed or as to the exact location of the deeded 
property in 1992. It was not until a survey was completed after the decision on the 
cross-motions for summary judgment was issued that such knowledge of the access 
roadway was obtained. It is the appellees' argument that due diligence required the 
Halls to have the property surveyed prior to trial. The ultimate question is whether 
due diligence requires the Halls to obtain a survey of the deeded property prior to trial 
without knowing the location of the actual deeded property and given the factual 
representations of the Peays throughout the litigation and discovery process. 
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The Supreme Court has stated that to "entitle a party to a new trial on the 
ground of newly discovered evidence, it must appear (1) that he used reasonable 
diligence to discover and produce such evidence at the former trial and that his failure 
was not due to his own negligence . . . (5) that the defeated party had no opportunity 
to make the defense or was prevented from so doing by unavoidable accident or the 
fraud or improper conduct of the other party." Kloppenstein v. Hayes, 57 P. 712 
(Utah 1899). 
Not only are the interests of justice satisfied if a new trial is granted, but there is 
little, if any, prejudice which would occur to the Peays. The deed and the location of 
the deed as compared to the access road are crucial issues which have not been 
significantly addressed and would clearly have a substantial bearing on the outcome of 
the current litigation. The Halls used reasonable or due diligence in handling 
themselves throughout the course of the litigation as based on the facts presented to 
them by the Peays that the Peays owned 100% of the access road. The Halls should 
not be forced or punished to spend a considerable sum of money on a survey because 
of their complete reliance upon the representations of the Peays throughout the course 
of litigation. Therefore, the lower court's ruling on the motion for new trial should 
be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts clearly demonstrate that permission was never given to the Halls. The 
family relationship does not impute permission or a neighborly accommodation to the 
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Halls from the Peays- Also, the Peays' routine maintenance on the roadway is not 
sufficient to stop a prescriptive easement from arising given the original intent of the 
Peays. Finally, the Halls are extremely prejudiced if the newly discovered evidence is 
not permitted. The Peays did not own the land over which they apparently granted 
permission and, therefore, a prescriptive easement should arise in favor of the Halls. 
DATED this _2Z day of June, 2005. 
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HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
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